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Despite the claims often made about Jordan, rang-
ing from the positive view that it is an island of sta-
bility in a sea of regional turmoil, to the more apoca-
lyptic predictions of imminent collapse due to 
insurmountable problems, the one inescapable fact 
is that the Hashemite monarchy remains and Jordan 
is stable – even if it is not flourishing. A survey of 
public dissent in Jordan over the past 20 years 
found that concerted politically-related public dis-
sent has significantly declined since 2011-2012, 
and in comparison to neighbouring states, has been 
very limited over the past two years. Furthermore, 
this dissent has generally targeted external actors 
(Israel and the US have been targeted the most) and 
the Jordanian government and individual politicians. 
Public dissent directed towards King Abdullah II or 
the monarchy in general has been limited: only 15 
out of 272 occurrences of significant public dissent 
explicitly targeted King Abdullah over the past dec-
ade or so. The Hashemite monarchy does not face 
an imminent threat to its survival, and neither does 
Jordan. Furthermore, Jordan’s stability and prosper-
ity remain central to the security of neighbouring 
states (especially Israel) and the broader Middle 
East; and the US, European powers and GCC 
states, in particular, remain committed to support-
ing Jordan. However, there are serious long-term 
structural challenges to the country’s political sta-
bility and economic growth that command the at-
tention of the government, and other domestic and 
foreign stakeholders in the short term.
Economic Liberalization and the Politics of 
Tradition in Jordan
Economic liberalization in Jordan has rapidly ex-
panded under King Abdullah, and is presented as a 
means to transform Jordan into a business-friendly 
environment in order to attract foreign direct invest-
ment, kick-start domestic industrialization and im-
prove the well-being of average Jordanians. This 
programme of reform has its roots in the post-1989 
financial crisis recovery directed largely by the IMF, 
and includes a wide-ranging privatization programme 
(begun in 2000), World Trade Organization member-
ship (2000), a series of bilateral and multilateral Free 
Trade Agreements, the creation of the Jordan Anti-
Corruption Commission (2004), and the creation of 
the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee (2016). 
Privatization, free trade and anti-corruption legisla-
tion have all exposed Jordanian companies and ordi-
nary citizens to greater competition from the global 
economy and have subsequently been criticized 
(with ‘talk on the streets’ that the privatization pro-
gramme, for example, has been misused by the po-
litical elite to fill their own bank accounts).
This programme of economic reform is reshaping 
the ways in which the Jordanian market has tradi-
tionally operated, and this has become more evident 
in the past year. Economic liberalization has begun 
to alter the socio-economic and socio-political 
landscape, undermining traditional practices that 
are not seen as business-friendly. Wasta,1 nepotism 
1 Wasta is an Arabic word that refers to a type of social relationship between two or more individuals. Wasta refers to having a personal con-
nection that is used in order to attain something that would otherwise be unattainable, or at least very difficult to attain. It derives from the 
Arabic word ‘Wasitah’ which can be translated as ‘medium’ or ‘in the middle.’
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and favouritism, for example, are slowly being re-
placed by an emphasis on meritocracy, productivity 
and profitability. The creation of a business-friendly 
and globally-integrated neoliberal economic envi-
ronment does not sit well with the politics of tradi-
tion in Jordan. The Arab Spring experience of 2011-
2012, best embodied by the Hirak Movement of 
East Bank tribal youths (Yom, 2014) provided evi-
dence of the erosion of the traditional monarchical 
support base. The most vocal and organized dis-
sent since 2011 came from the Hirak Movement, 
tribal elders and public sector workers. At the cen-
tre of this criticism lay concerns with the uneven ef-
fects of Jordan’s economic liberalization and politi-
cal retrenchment. Three primary facets of economic 
reform have caused most discontent: macro-eco-
nomic structural adjustments, privatization of na-
tional assets, and trade liberalization.
Support for the monarchy has historically come 
from East Banker communities (what we can term 
the political right) (Antoun, 2006). In particular, East 
Bank tribes and the small Circassian community 
provided the backbone of the public (low level), po-
litical (elite level) and defence sectors in Jordan. The 
East Banker domination of the public, political and 
defence spheres has traditionally relied on, and in 
turn fostered, a state-society contract that has em-
bedded Wasta, nepotism, public sector practices of 
favouring East Bankers over West Bankers, inequi-
table political representation, and what most would 
term endemic corruption and a lack of transparency 
(Loewe et al., 2008). This state-society contract has 
been most evident in the practice of providing pub-
lic sector employment (often expected or unofficial-
ly guaranteed for East Bankers and/or those with 
Wasta) with little regard for qualifications and skills. 
We can best describe this system as one of favour-
itism with the balancing feature being West Banker 
domination of the private sector.
But herein lies the root of the emerging crisis in Jor-
danian politics that is likely to deepen further in 
2018. The politics of tradition are being under-
mined. The economic reforms initially driven by out-
side actors (the IMF and World Bank) and now driv-
en by domestic stakeholders (including King 
Abdullah) require a systemic shift away from the em-
bedded traditional structures with an emphasis in-
creasingly being placed on meritocracy, efficiency, 
productivity and accountability. The business-
friendly and globally integrated environment created 
by neoliberalization means that Wasta, nepotism 
and corruption have come under greater scrutiny 
and play a reduced role. But as cornerstones of 
East Banker support for the monarchy, their decline 
could weaken the traditional monarchical support 
base as East Bankers are marginalized from the pri-
vate sector while at the same time receiving less fa-
vours from the State.
A Weathered Democratic Façade
Jordan’s governing system is a classic example of 
an autocratic constitutional monarchy where the 
King has a great deal of authority with few real re-
strictions and little oversight. We can identify mo-
ments in Jordan’s political history that represent a 
carefully managed process of democratization – the 
legalization of political parties and resumption of 
parliamentary elections in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, for example – but we can just as easily say 
that Jordan has had at best a democratic façade 
(Milton-Edwards, 1993; AlkadIri, 2007; Ryan, 2013) 
that has in the past two years or so weathered even 
further away. Jordanian political parties remain un-
derdeveloped: 22 parties currently operate, but 
since the last election in September 2016 only nine 
have members elected to the House of Representa-
tives (Jordan’s lower house of parliament). Com-
bined, these parliamentarians total only 30 out of 
the 130 seats, with the remaining 100 seats occu-
pied by independents. All 65 seats in the Senate 
(Jordan’s upper house of parliament) are occupied 
by independents, and the most important executive 
level positions, including the Prime Ministership 
(Hani Mulki since May 2016) are also staffed by in-
dependents. No party has a broad popular base 
and national agenda, and the Islamic Action Front 
(the political wing of the Jordanian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) with the broadest member-
ship and longest history of political participation, 
only has 10 seats in the House of Representatives.
In short, politics in Jordan is still dominated by local-
ized agendas and narrow support bases, deter-
mined by tribal affiliations (for East Bankers) and the 
day-to-day concerns of ordinary citizens (especially 
for West Bankers). This has led to divisive political 
discourse at the national level, and narrow, short-
Pa
no
ra
m
a
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
al
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 | 
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t 
an
d 
Tu
rk
ey
IE
M
ed
. M
ed
ite
rr
an
ea
n 
Ye
ar
bo
ok
 2
01
8
22
2
term politics at the local level that do not appear to 
be going away in the near future. This situation has 
also allowed the monarchy to re-centralize political 
power, even to the extent of rolling back political re-
forms enacted as a response to the Arab Spring.
Persistent Challenges to Growth and 
Stability
As a small, resource-poor and largely arid state, Jor-
dan faces severe structural limitations to its eco-
nomic development and political stability. At the end 
of 2017 Jordan’s population approached 10 million 
(including significant numbers of Syrian and Iraqi 
refugees that most estimates put at between 1.5 to 
2 million). Its GDP is approximately US$39.5 billion 
– ranking 91st out of 191 countries according to the 
International Monetary Fund. The World Bank clas-
sifies Jordan as a lower middle-income country, a 
status demonstrated by its relatively low US$5,092 
per capita income (which has remained largely un-
changed since the 2008-2009 financial crisis). Jor-
dan has very limited reserves of almost all of the 
natural resources modern economies need and it 
continues to rely on imports for 97% of its fuel 
needs, and large quantities of its food, manufac-
tured goods, chemicals and other high-value-added 
products. In 2017, imports of hydrocarbons (primar-
ily liquefied natural gas from Qatar and natural gas 
from Egypt) cost the government approximately 
US$3.5 billion – the government is the initial pur-
chaser of fuel, which it then sells on to the domestic 
market. This has put enormous pressure on the gov-
ernment’s budget and accounts for a large propor-
tion of the budget deficit, which hit $2.653 billion in 
2017 (equivalent to 6.5% of GDP). As Laurie Brand 
(1994) demonstrated, regime survival and budget-
ary security in Jordan are inseparably linked. Jor-
dan’s perennial budget deficit is, therefore, of great 
concern for the Hashemite monarchy.
The most pressing resource scarcity faced by Jor-
danians is the lack of freshwater (Cammett et al., 
2015) and this problem has only worsened over the 
last year. The UN-designated freshwater poverty 
line is 1,000 cubic metres per person per year, yet 
Jordan’s internal renewable resources dwindled fur-
ther in 2017 and it now only possesses 123.4 cubic 
metres per person (AQUASTAT). The UN’s Food 
and Agriculture Organization ranks Jordan as one of 
the five most freshwater poor countries in the world, 
and predicts that this situation is set to worsen with 
the continued pressure of the more than one million 
Syrian refugees that have found sanctuary in Jordan 
since 2011 (approximately one Syrian for every five 
Jordanians). With no end in sight to the Syrian civil 
war, the pressure that this rapid increase in popula-
tion has placed on Jordan’s limited freshwater re-
serves is not likely to be alleviated in 2018.
Regime survival and budgetary 
security in Jordan are inseparably 
linked. Jordan’s perennial budget 
deficit is, therefore, of great concern 
for the Hashemite monarchy
Another key limitation to Jordan’s growth and stabil-
ity also worsened in 2017: unemployment and 
underemployment. The official unemployment rate 
recorded by the Jordanian government is 16.5% of 
the total working-age population. The official figure 
is widely regarded as optimistic and the real unem-
ployment rate is likely to be closer to 30%. This is 
high and is concerning given the need to placate 
Jordan’s well-educated and young labour force. A 
large proportion of the population is unable to earn 
a living wage to support themselves and their de-
pendents which hinders efforts aimed at both pov-
erty alleviation and human development. Further-
more, this high unemployment rate means Jordan’s 
labour market is saturated, driving down salaries. 
The problem of underemployment is rarely consid-
ered, but is perhaps just as worrying for Jordan in 
the coming years. Out of the 83.5% of the working 
age population in 2017 that were regarded as being 
employed, a significant number are likely to be em-
ployed in only seasonal, day-to-day, or part-time 
work meaning they have little job security and very 
low incomes. The government does not offer suffi-
cient support to those who are unemployed be-
cause of the very constrained government budget.
Unemployment and underemployment pose even 
more serious obstacles to development when in 
2017 approximately 55% of the population was re-
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corded as being under 25 years old, and unemploy-
ment and underemployment are most prevalent in the 
15 to 30-year-old age range. The concern for the 
government in particular, therefore, is that Jordan has 
an expanding, youthful and educated population that 
does not have sufficient employment opportunities. 
Jordan is one of the five most 
freshwater poor countries in the 
world, and it is predicted that this 
situation is set to worsen with the 
continued pressure of the more than 
one million Syrian refugees that have 
found sanctuary in Jordan since 2011
Over the coming year this could translate into more 
frustration and dissent on the streets as Jordan’s 
economy is expected to once again grow very slow-
ly. This will further undermine the government’s at-
tempts at poverty alleviation, which is seen as an-
other factor working against continued political 
stability. Poverty in Jordan is an enduring problem, 
with 2017 estimates suggesting that 14.2% of the 
population lives below the poverty line (which the 
World Bank puts at US$1.90 per person per day). 
The inroads made by Islamist extremist ideology 
and Salafist groups in Jordan’s lower and middle 
classes (Jordan is estimated to have had the highest 
per capita rate of extremists fighting with the so-
called Islamic State and other jihadist groups in Syr-
ia and Iraq since 2014) has in part been fuelled by 
unemployment, underemployment and poverty. The 
failure to combat these three problems is, therefore, 
likely to encourage the spread of Islamist influence 
in Jordanian society.
Conclusion: Jordan’s Balancing Act
In the second year of its 18th Parliament, Jordan 
needs to continue its balancing act between re-
sponding to long-term challenges to its economic 
growth and political stability on the one hand, and 
maintaining short-term budgetary security and pur-
suing political reform on the other. Underlying mac-
roeconomic weakness combined with the slow 
marginalization of East Bankers in the era of eco-
nomic liberalization is likely to undermine the tradi-
tional support base of the Hashemite monarchy. 
Yet, the continued leadership of King Abdullah and 
the stability of the current government look set to 
carry Jordan through another year of economic and 
political challenges through being proactive and 
realistic.
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